IN FÁCT AND INFATTIz THE SAME, SIMILAR
OR DIFFERENT Silvia Bruti
0.Introduction
There is an area of non-equivalence between infact andinfatti in terms of their functions in English and Italian discourse and I would like to investigate to what extent this area develops. The literature concerning expressions like in fact/infal/i points out that they represent a serious difficulty for non-native speakers (Browne 1987) , because conespondence across languages may be defective. A connective may be lacking in one language, or, when it exists, it often shares a different value. Since connectives mainly serve an interactive function which varies according to the language and mirrors the behavioural rules of a community, non-native speakers and students should be made awaÍe of their contrastive functions, in order to avoid pragmatic mistakes and awkwardness.
In the present research I will analyze spoken data in both English and Italian conversations, although some references to monologic argumentative discourse might be useful to better chnacteize the nature of these connectives.
Connectives : the state-of-the-art
Expressions hke in fact/infatti have been variously referred to as "attitudinal disjuncts" (Quirk and Greenb awn 1976) , "discourse markers" (Schiffrin 1987; Fraser 1990; Redeker 1990) , "pragmatic/metatextuaVdiscursive connectives" (van Dijk L979; Bazzanella 1985 Bazzanella , 1986 Bazzanella , 1990 Caron 1987) , and in Italian particelle conversazionali 'conversational particles', connettivi testuali 'textual connectors' (Berretta 1984) or, more often, segnali dis c o r s ivi' di scourse markers' (Orletti | 99 4 ; B azzanella 1 99 5 ). Quirk et al. (197 6) identiff "attitudinal disjuncts" as those unnecessary constituents of a clause which may express a reservation about a preceding portion of text or about what is to follow. Schiffrin (1987) , who has offered the most thorough review of markers so far, describes markers in a large corpus of conversational data and attempts to give them a functional meaning. She also develops a theoretical model to evaluate how/to what extent markers contribute to the coherence of discourse. In particular, she investigates how the same item has to be understood differently according to its role at different points in the conversation. The flexibility and the lack of constraints of her analysis do not always permit to make successful generalisations on the basis of a few context-dependent interpretations. The merit of this research lies however in the attempt to propose a DOI: 10.1075/prag.9.4.04bru taxonomy of discourse functions. Fraser(1990) identifies three differenttypes ofmarkers: "basicpragmatic markers", "commentary markers" and "parallel markers". Discourse markers are one type of "commentary markers", whose main task is that of pointing out how the message relates to the preceding text. So their function is mainly to pinpoint a sequential relationship within discourse. Fraser's approach is aimed at establishing the nature of markers, and consequently how they should be defined as a linguistic category. He disagrees with Schiffrin's statement about markers' core meaning and suggests they have only a core pragmatic meaning, without any content meaning. Discourse markers are kept apart from other types of commentary markers, from vocatives, interjections, and expressions such as "y'kÍrow", "I mean", which he does not treat as markers. Bazzanella (1985 Bazzanella ( , 1986 Bazzanella ( , 1990 prefers to use the term "connectives". She distinguishes "phatic connectives", whichcorrespond to what other linguists call "discourse particles/maÍkers", from "pragmatic connectives", which play a metatextual role. She shares Fraser's thesis concerning markers' lack of relation to the propositional content of an utterance. In her final classification (1995) she identifies three main functions: the interactional (markers which belong either to the speaker's line or to the addressee's line), the metatextual (for those markers which organise the text), and the cognitive function.
The taxonomies proposed either establish criteria for distinction on the basis of syntactic features, semantic properties or discursive functions, very often mixing up the parameters, or record the different uses a marker may have in discourse (Wierzbicka 1986 ).
Starting hypotheses
Besides the syntactic criteria (the tests of interrogation, negation and pronominal substitution; see Bazzanella 1995) which establish that markers do not belong to the number of the obligatory constituents of a clause, another prerequisite is the fact that they do not contribute to the propositional content (Fraser 1990: 3ï9; Bazzartella 1995: 228) .It is true that the propositional content does not change if the connectiver is erased, yet if a connective has been chosen among many options, its meaning should be somehow relevant to the content.
Both in fact and infatti satisff the above mentioned syntactic criteria, and their lexical meaning seems to contribute to the definition of the illocutionary force of the utterance. If we admit that they both have some influence on the illocutionary force of the utterance, and if we recognize that their lexical meaning is more or less correspondent, we are justified in expecting similarity in their pragmatic functions. In reality it must be acknowledged that similarity is very scanty indeed. What I actually found is the following pattern. Whereas infact introduces an autonomous argumentative assertion, infatti signals acquiescence or compliance. So in English in fact is forward-oriented, in that it allows semantic and pragmatic progression of discourse and interaction, while infatti displays agreement with the co-speaker but points backwards. In other words, it does not allow text progress. ' The term "connective" appears more useful in that it stesses the general relational function that this category usually performs.
A suitable starting point for my argumentation is a comparison of the discursive functions of both corurectives. Among many models, I have adopted Bazzanella's taxonomy of functions, which is displayed in the following figures. Inassigning functions to connectiveswe generallydiscriminate andchoosethemost relevant ones, but there may be a coalescence of many in a single utterance. Bazzanella (1995) , for instance, distinguishes the metatextual from the interactional function and to the former she ascribes all the indicators ofreformulation, whereas to the latter the markers of modulation, e.g. cataphoric signals of precision. But in this respect I think that it is hardly possible to fix a boundary between the two functions, since both reformulation and modulation in terms of grades of precision serve the same goal of communicative effectiveness. Modulation may be conceived as an instance of the more general act of reformulating (cf. Caffi 1990) , where modulation is seen as the superordinate category of both intensification and mitigation).
Let's now consider some examples2 and identity functional correspondence, if any. A:
B:
(4) 
In fact and tnfatli: The same, similar or diferent? 523 C: Well no Sgarbi with Let's start again from number two or three [title of a TV programme] whatever I don't remenrber starring Raffaella Canà he lectures on art on Saturdays and goes and visits various places, I mean in Italy, also unknown places, which people nmy disregard a little and he introduces them for instance he went to Bramante's temple B:
But he's a public menace for he's always on the move A:
He is indeed B: Andíanto avanti allora chi parla? F:
Eh Paolo da Milano B:
Buonasera Paolo F:
Buonasera saluti a tLtíti B:
Alzi la voce per cot'tesia grazie [...J F:
Senta volevo domandare questo eh non credete che nell'Inter [pausal al di là dei giocatori che non si intpegnano pià di tanto perclré molto probabílmente sono denrctivati ms credo che Trapattoni oltre ad essere un buon allenatore gli altri aruifaceva anche da dirigente nell'lnter cioèfaceva eh B:
Si si F;
Legava tra i giocatori e la socieÍà oggi a nte senrbra clre questa società non abbia collegamenti [.
Qualcuno diceva ma Trapattoni li si deve occupare un po' di tltíto invece dicevano eh guarda il Milan il team manager eh il coso di qui e Ramaccioni e Braida adesso A:
Let's go on then. Who is it? F:
It's Paolo from Milan B:
Good evening Paolo F:
Good evening to everybodY B:
Can you speak up please [..] F:
I'd like to ask this mm don't you think that Inter players well apart from the fact that they don't put much in it maybe because their heart's not in it but I think that Trapattoni what's more is a good coach in the past he was also one of the team managers that is he B:
Yes he was F:
He was a link between the players and the society but now I think this club has no links [. Si inJittti A:
Lei ce I'avrà già bianco C:
No ce I'ho sentpre giallo B:
Conte la nia ntoto C:
E infatti lavoro molto pià dei ruiei colleghi (La Ruota della Fortmta 27/5/95) A:
What about the fact that taxies are a different colour now? B:
Yes, they are A:
Yours must be white C:
No, I've got a yellow one Number (1) to (4) are all instances ofmetatextual functions. (1) is a correction, (2) and (3) are reformulations, (4) is a modulation in more precise terms (whichinBazzanella's tar<onomy belongs to the interactional function, but I think it is practically equivalent with the metatextual reformulation); (5) signals topic management3, i.e. a topic shift. Example (1), (2), and (4) seem instances ofmonologic argumentative discourse, butthey are actually inserted in dialogic exchanges, where the speaker is trying to uphold her/his own opinion and finally convince the listener.
Number (6), (7) and (8) show how iffittl signals agreement inresponses; in (9) the first instance of ínfatti is an affention-granting device, rather than a signal of agreement, whereas the second codes a causal relation. Infatti is often used to link results to their causes (Serianni 1988: 542) : The second occurrence in (9) is an example of this type. Yellow was the most typical colour for tanis, until white was also introduced. But yellow caÍs are immediately identified as tar<is, whereas white ones are not. One needs to read the word taxi or identify a company logo before being sure that it is a taxi.
In Italian the "causal" iníatti is widely used both in conversation and in monologic discourse. The functions it performs in these two discourse modes are not totally divergent. AaAlthoughmonologic argumentative discourseis notwithinthe scope ofthispaper,Iwill ' For a description of the role of topic in the construction of conversational coherence and cooperativeness see Bublitz 1988. aAs I have already stated, monologic argumentative discourse is not the focus of the presentpaper.
Yet a brief look at an example of legal discourse (Alcaro 1996) shows that "causal" iníatti is widely used: a) Non avrebbe senso [nel caso degli atti cosidetti personalissimi] parlare di una mera incapacità di agire: Nessuno infatti protrebbe sostituire il soggetto nel compimento di quegli atti e dunque si potrebbe pensare all'assenza della stessa titolarita astratta della situazione giuridica venendo a mancare cioè l'imputabilità stessa dell'effetto giuridico. Il soggetto non puà infatti in nessun modo essere parte della situazione in esame, per cui, rispetto a quegli atti, egli appaÍe non solo incapace di agire, ma anche incapace giuridicamente (Alcaro 1996: 3l 
La formula dell' 832 [del codice civile, S.B.] deve essere peralfro, caso per caso, rapportata ed integrata con le discipline speciali dettate per i singoli beni, con risultati ed effetti che potranno comprimere l'assolutezza e la pienezza del diritto. Sarebbe infatti illusorio pensare che possa esistere un concetto univoco di proprietà adatto per tutte le categorie di briefly come back to this later. As for infatti,Bazzanella's model is not fine-grained enough to descibe the scalar dimension of agreement. On the addressee scale she identifies the function "agreemenVconfirmationgranted", but shedoesnot specifrthe intensity, whichis essential for infatti,because it does not belong to the economy of her investigation. As we shall see, sometimes infatti is uttered by a speaker with a low degree of commitment, either when s/he wants to end the present topic, or when sÁre employs it as a safe way to participate a conversation which slhe finds boring and dull. In (10) infatti underlines a topic closing. As can be seen, only example (5) of infact finds a functional correspondence with iníatti of (10), and the area of functional divergence is certainly wider. The only discursive function they seem to share is that of topic managment.
3. In fuct/infatti and the nature of the illocutionary force A first hypothesis and a first step in the analysis has been that in each language the expression preferentially occurs in some speech act types. It is the context within which in fact and infotti occur that specifies the global force of the markers. According to our investigation in fact appeaÍs preferentially in assertives. Conversely, the overwhelming majority of instances of infatti occur in second-speakerresponses, either alone orwith other words (e 'and', si 'yes', no 'no'). These short answers are sequences to implied disagreement, passing through the middle stage of partial agreement.
The illucutionary status of an utterance results from the calculation of the effect of many different micro-oscillations produced by the different constituents of an utterance, each of which is an illocutionary force indicator (for a discussion of the dimentions of illocutionary force to which downgrading/upgrading applies cf. Dressler and Merlini Barbaresi 1994:281) . Markers of the type of infact/infatti contrl.-óate to this count oas illocutionary force indicating devices that interact with other indicators. ModiÍication of illocutionary force may concern different dimensions. As Bazzanella et al (1990) have shown, illocutionary force may be modified, either by downgrading or upgrading its intensity, on four different dimensions: 1) propositional content, 2) expressed inner states, 3) modal roles of participants and 4) perlocutionary goals. Each category is then divided into finer sub-categories.
Let's first have a look at the English examples of assertives.
ASSERTIVES:
A: Which foot have you got a verruca on? Just get another sock out. you must have millions. B:
I haven't got very many socks. I haven't got any socks in fact. (C)
A: I only missed two preps. That is strange. In fact I only missed one prep (BNC) beni (Alcaro 1996: 35) . This metatextual function in monologic discourse should be further investigated, for it might prove to be an area where the English and the Italian connective perform similar or identical functions.
( 13) (14) at the time, I cau't remember much about it. In fact I can't remember anything about it... (BNC) and you flaugh] may as well do your own thing. So in the sunilner term in theory you could continue that part-time attendance then is that right? Yes I think in fact if you hadn't put in your eÍm appropriate amount you had to continue. Yes. The school had to take you on if you hadn't done as much as as many d Vfith the class of assertives variation of force especially applies to the illocutionary point and to sincerity conditions (Searle 1969; Searle and Vanderveken 1985) , or to the propositional content and to the modal roles of the participants, especially to the speaker's coÍnmifinent, if one refers toBazzanella et al. (1990) .
Most of the occurences of infact in assertives are conections, or, in other words, upgradings of the propositional content or augmentations in terms of precision or determinacy. Here infactvndertakesthecataphoric functionofindicatingthereformulation which is to follow in variable forms: Paraphrase (repeating the same contentl signatum with alternative Iexis/signans), very rarely relevant for in fact, correction (entailing a total change) and specification, usually in numeric details. Infact fits an illocutionary act which displays the speaker's intention of making herlhis contribution as clear as possible, and signals that cooperativeness is being pursued. The maxims of Quality and Quantity (Grice 1975 ) are carefully complied with, especially through correction and details, whereas the maxim of Manner is taken care of through paraphrase and exemplification.
Assertives generally expound the locutor's peÍsonal point ofview on a certain state of affairs; this entails a modalization5 of discourse both at a global and local level (this is whatBazzanella et al. subsume under the label of "modal roles of participants"). Since argumentative discourse develops from the cognitive sphere ofpersonal beliefs, epistemic modality is here particularly relevant. An epistemic modifier can contribute to the truth of a micro-or a macro-proposition. So in fact is included in the speaker's line of argumentation and belongs to the epistemic dimension.
There are, however, otherindicatorspertainingto thereceiver's isotopic line,which do not interfere with the locutor's subscription ofher/his thesis. This latter group expresses the high degree of inferability of a statement. My next aim is to ascertain whether infact actually belongs to the class of epistemic or to that of inferability indicators. In other words, as Merlini Barbaresi (1987) claims for other expressions, even when a speaker judges the degree of inferability of herlhis own thesis s/he signals in the meantime herftris own commitment. Therefore s/he performs two functions simultaneously. Yet, since both functions are acted out by the speaker, who strategically anticipates possible objections ' For a similar notion of "modalization" see Merlini Barbaresi (1987) . For a complete discussion on modality cf. Kiefer (1987) . The three most important notions of modality Kiefer identifies are the following: 1) modality as an expression of possibility and necessity; 2) modality as the meaning of propositional attitudes; 3) modality as expression of the speaker's attitudes (which is the aspect in which I am interested in the discussion of infact). from the addressee by temporalily performing the opponent's role, it is difficult to establish incontrovertibly to which line the modifier belongs. In this concern, Merlini Barbaresi proposes to consider this new line as referring to a third participant role as "a projection of the locutor's mind engaged in alternative courses ofreasoning" and to subsume it underthe epistemic evaluation. Still, there are cases where the patent value of obviousness corresponding to a high degree of inferability makes the thesis objective and selÊevident. Lyons (7977, 1981) seems to refer to this borderline area when he distinguishes and displays, as we have aheady pointed out, the speaker's epistemic responsability, while in the latter the evidence of the truth of the utterance does not lie within the speaker's epistemic world but may be ascribed to the so-called shared knowledge, available both to the speaker and to the addressee. Lyons calls this operation "objectivized modality".
In(2) the speaker engages in a modification of her/his own speech s/he first states apossibility with "can" but adds "wi11" followed by infact. The modals intervene here to define the speaker's epistemic certainty. With "can" s/he first suggests the possibility of future action, by stating the actual ability of her/his referent to perform an action. The assignment of ability insituates that the action will be performed. Then, with "will", s/he expresses a higher degree of certainty, and a high degree of subjective commitment. The following element, infact, signals the high inferability ofthe speaker's thesis. The presence of two elements belonging subjectiveness and objectiveness. In (3) as well there is a progression of predictions: "going to" (announcing inevitable future events), then "may" * infact, and finally "will". The second prediction is less certain than the first and infact introduces the same propositional content, but changes in terms of argumentation. With "will" the speakermoves towards certainty andresponsability, yetepreserving inferability.
In examples (1 1) to (1a) in fact announces a reformulation in more precise terms. A shift towards more precision implies an upgrading of the propositional content. The meaning of in fact gives us the key to the interpretation: Its function is that of making it easier for the addressee to follow the reasoning of the speaker. Thus it is not so much an expression of the speaker's belief as of her/his attitude towards the degree of inferability of her/his statements. The presence of in fact signals that the speaker judges her/tris assertions easily inferable.
In case of high inferability, the speaker decides to emphasizethe selÊevidence of her/tris reasoning, whichmeans a shifttowards lesspersonalcommitment oradowngrading of subjective involvement. This does not mean that the overall assertive force is downgraded (it is argumentative force that is downgraded). Quite the contrary, for although the speaker does not show her/his involvement ("expressed inner states" inBazzanella et a1.), the propositional content is often intensified in precision and objectiveness. Infact is aimed to express the locutor's certainty by way of underlining the high degree of inferability of her/his thesis. In this way, by emphasising its objective, easily perceivable quality, the speaker achieves the goal of making a subjective idea acceptable.
If we check what happens with other speech act types we find out that infact again introduces the speaker's elucidation of her/his own previous statement (there are a few cases ofmodification ofotherpeople's contribution, obviously forpoliteness implications). The locutor clearly displays her/his intention to make her/his contribution clearer. In ( 1 5) and ( 1 6) infact conffibutes to deÍine the degree of strength of the illocutionary force by operating on the propositional content. In both cases it serves the purpose of clarification. In (15) it dispels the confusion the speaker himself generated (in uttering "uncompromisingly" and o'compromisingly') and in (16) the locutor intemrpts himself in order to organise her/tris ideas and give them a higher degree of precision with a second attempt. In (5) in fact annormces a topic shifting and highlights a dishomogeneity in the management of textual topics. The degree of precision is looked for to prevent the addressee's possible objections. The ultimate degree of strength results thus from the calculation of the synergic modifications of all the different indicators. With commissives, (17) to (19), infact shares teh same function and introduces a reshaping of the content in the direction of more precision. Espicially with commissives, where a speaker undertakes a responsibility for the future, it is important to specify the límits of the commitment. In (17) the speaker's commitment is not actually specified in detail, but it is nonetheless upgraded. Let us turn to ltalian. As I anticipated above, infatti mainly occws in secondspeaker agreement responses. Infatti actually occurs in monologic and written discourse too. In these two formats it mainly operates as a conjunction which marks exemplification or demonstration of thematic connectedness. Sometimes, even in dialogic spoken or demonstration of thematic connectedness. Sometimes, even in dialogic spoken discourse, infattimay underline this aspect oftextual coherence. In general, in all these cases it is used argumentatively to support what has been stated before. This function is not totally different from the one that can be found in second-speaker agreement, but the commitmet is definitely stronger. In other words, the monologic argumentative we of infatti mightbe envisaged ÍIs an extension of the agreement expressing dialogical firnction. The matter should however be more extensively investigated (for a discussion of iníatti in argumentative discourse see Freddi 1998) .
The range of functions it performs is more limited than that of in fact; yet, in agreement sequences infatti may occur with varying degrees of commitment: On the gradient of agreement it can express the manimum level of agreement, a partial level, or even ironic disapproval. Simple forms of agreement are shown in examples (6), (7), (8) above.
Sometimes the contribution of the addressee is so limited that the sequence where infatti occurs does not seem to promote any ne\ry information unit either concerning the interaction or the locutor's own discourse. As always when scalar dimension is at stake, there are numerous intermediate positions between the pole ofunconditional agreement and that of absolute disagreement. I have observed that in partial agreement infatti can convey an uncommitted subscription to the locutor's line of reasoning, which may be due to the addressee's desire to rapidly come to an end or to express feigned solidarity for politeness. In both cases, infatti is almost desemanticized, inclining clearly to a pathic response. In example (10) speaker A is answering listlessly to his friend's question. His 'si infatti" sounds final and leaves no room to objections or expansions, for it is followed by the focaliser " as c o lt a" . which is forward-oriented. (20) Poi ti vie li prendi, a te da sola elt in un colpo solo Li prendo tutti Si puà fare ut po' di scouto Ecco bene questo è un bttort discorso infutti perché se no Mm sui libri si sulle cassette no perclÉ ni costano molto a a nle Eh a ír{otti itturngino si si Sentpre si senpre il solito discorso. (PIXI Bof F-lB/b5) Then I you come take them, you alone all at once I'll take them all You can have a discount Well, that's a good thing@ because otherwise Erm there is a discount for books, but not for tapes because they're expensive for me Mm but I see it's always the same matter In (20) the second occurrence of infatti uttered by B does not seem to signal a deep-felt agreement: There are actually several indicators ofB's disappoinfinent when she is told that types are excluded from the discount formula: The parenthetical verb "immagino" narows the subscription to the truth of the proposition. Ye| being a subjective evaluation (Venier 1991: 1 18) , it still leaves the matter unsettled. It is in uttering "sempre il solito discorso" that the speaker presents her conclusion through implicature. Without explicitly stating that, she means that the preceding explanation is the typical excuse bookshop assistants produce when asked for discounts. kony usually corresponds to pretended empathy, with the intent ofhurting the listener (Litman and May l99l: I47; seeMerlini Barbaresi for"aggtavation strategies").
We admitted the possibility of finding cases of implied disagreement on the basis of intuitive predictions and experience, but in our corpus we actually came across two examples:
La gente pensa che un insegnante nonfaccia niente. Mi dicono ti cerchiamo tno, non ci sei mai sei una girottolona (dialect for girellona, 'a gadabout'). Si infatti...
A:
People think that teachers don't work enough. They tell me that I can never be found at home, that I always gad about. They have every right to say so!!
La Stanza di Montanelli "Milano: a favore dei vigili. Una politico sconsiderata" A:
Vigili picchiatí in piazza Duortto, leggo in wt articolo del Corriere del 28 ntarzo. Ecco il frutto della sconsiderata politica di Albertini e della sua gíwfia e degli articolí di Montanelli nei conf'ontí deí vigíli. S'è mai visto che wt sindaco nonfaccia altro che acuire la tensione tra i suoi vigili e la cittadinanza? Queste due righe non saranno pubblicate, dato il conclamato malaninto di Monatnellí nei confi'onti dei vigili. Elda Carini, Milano. B:
Itfatti. Montanelli's room [page where a famous journalist publishes and comments letters from his readers] "Milatr: supporting policemen against an irresponsible policy" A:
On the 28tr' march I read in the Corriere that some policemen had been beaten inPiazza Duomo. That is the outcome of Albertini [the mayor] and the town council's irresponsible policy and Montanelli's articles against policemen. Has it ever been heard that a mayor favours conflict between his policemen and citizens? There is no doubt that this letter will not be published because of Montanelli's sworn ill-will towards policemen. Elda Carini, Milan. B:
[the joumalist publishes the letter and adds his comment]: Here it is! 6
In (21) iníatti occurs in the speaker's turn of speech, but the apparent agreement, which is actually disagreement, refers to an absent interlocutor's hlpothesis. Infattl is ironically uttered and its true meaning is retrievable through intonation and prosody, beside the contextual sifuation. The potential of irony enclosed ininfatti counts on the interlocutors' shared knowledge: The speaker knew that her addressee was well aware that she is a scrupulous teacher. In(22) the journalist ironically comments on the reader's letter. With one word only he rejects her accusation by showing that he is neither prejudiced nor ill-disposed towards policemen. Here again ínfatti has to be taken ironically, that is to say as something which means the opposite of what is actually said. In other words, a confirmationatthelevelof signantía impliesadis-confirmationatthat of signata. The reason for the low number of occurrences of infatti with this meaning is probably the high degree of mutual knowledge between co-speakers and the restricted situational setting, e.g., colloquial, familiar, peer gÍoup, or particular text type it requires.
Conclusions
On the whole I can advance a tentative conclusion, based on the results of my limited investigation.Infact is a typical connective in argumentation, preferentially used by the speaker when reshaping her/his previous assertion for precision's sake. Its modalizing function depends on its interaction with the other epistemic operators in the utterance, yet it frequently strengthens the credibility of a statement through its objective quality: it is the lexical meaning of in-(actual)-facts that enables the performance of this task. In argumentation it plays a very active, progressive role, not only for the speaker, but also for the interaction. By contrast infatti belongs to the addressee's line and occurs mostly in agreements. It caÍr cover a wide range of intensity of the illocutionary force, but most frequently it represents a low degree of commitment in agreement, and its lexical meaning tends to be obliterated. Although it does not prevent conversation from going on, it does not contribute to its progress either.
When translating my Italian examples into English, I never rendered infatti wíth in fact. TIns is partly due to the fact that I deliberately chose examples in which the two connectors perform totally different functions. In examples (6)-(10) I translated infattiwith the following expressions: "absolute1y", "that's right", 'he is indeed", "that's true", "y"r, they are", "actually", "well ". In one case I completely omitted it. In most cases I had to find a translation equivalence through the analysis of the pragmatic meaning of the utterances, which eventually led me to find a functional equivalence. In the vast majority of occurrences infatti expresses some type of agreement. Then I evaluated to what extent the speaker is actually committed, if s/he agrees with the content or with herlhis interlocutor, if the tone is formal or informal (Sinclair 1992).If instead I had to translate my English examples into Italian it would probably be acceptable to render some of the instances of in fact with infatti (cf. Browne 1987: I29) . From this analysis I think I have demonstrated that in fact has a remarkable progressive quality, whereas infatti is usually regressive. This conÍirms my initial thesis that correspondence between connectives across languages is often problematic: For infact andinfatti the area of functional equivalence amounts to almost nothing. They share only two basic discursive functions: They can function as topic management indicators and signal thematic connectedness in monologic discourse. In this latter case, both in English and in ltalian, the connector establishes an explanatory link between two text chunks, which it connects causally (Serianni 1988: 542) .
Probably I would find much to add to this partial conclusion by extending the scope of my analysis, either enlarging the textual types investigated, or introducing other connectors in order to ascertain if there is at least functional correspondence across languages (even if performed by semantically unrelated items).
